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LEASE TERMINATION: USE OF SUMMARY DISPOSSESS PROCEEDINGS
TO EFFECTIVELY TERMINATE A FRANCHISE
I. INTRODUCTION
Growth in the number of franchised businesses and in the volume of
business done by franchises in the last 25 years has made franchising a
significant part of the business world. Franchised businesses account for
an estimated 100 billion dollars of business annually, ten percent of the
gross national product and 25 percent of all retail sales.' The courts and
legislative bodies have been slow in reacting to the problems presented by
the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The substantial growth of fran-
chising has aggravated the existing problems.
The term franchise is quite broad and describes several different kinds
of relationships among the parties. For purposes of this article, the term
franchise is meant to include specifically the situation in which the
franchisee makes a contribution of capital to the enterprise. Although
the same potential for abuse may exist in other types of franchising rela-
tionships and much of what is said here is applicable to franchising gen-
erally, the focus of this study is that more narrow circumstance.
The franchisor-franchisee relationship is created by a contract, the
terms of which the courts have been reluctant to vary because of an his-
torical respect for freedom of contract. The relative bargaining posi-
tions of the parties have received little notice. The significance of the
parties' relative bargaining positions is seen most readily by considera-
tion of -termination clauses included in the franchise agreements. Such
clauses allow the franchisor to cancel the agreement upon the failure
of the franchisee to meet certain conditions or covenants included
therein. Some agreements provide that the franchisor may terminate at
will, if the specificed notice period is observed. While the franchisor
should have the power to terminate the franchise where, for example,
the franchisee fails to observe product quality standards which are rea-
sonable and set in good faith by the franchisor, the standard termination
clause presently used effectively provides for termination at the will of the
franchisor. Such discretionary termination conditions result in abuse of
the franchise relationship to the detriment of the franchisee.
A few courts have recognized the need to limit the franchisor's vir-
tually unlimited right to terminate when such termination is not for
cause.' However, franchisors may circumvent even this minimal limita-
tion in jurisdictions where such is recognized, by leasing or subleasing to
SSee Brown, Frarchiin-A Fiduciay Relationship, 49 TEXAS L REV. 650 (1971) [bere-
inafter cited as Brown]; Ray, Current Franchising Problems: A Rollback of Carcat Emptor,
8 AM. Bus. LJ. 231, 232 (1971).2 See Brown, supra note 1; Gellhorn, Limitations On Contract Termination Rights-
Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE LJ. 465.
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the franchisee the site upon which the franchised business is operated,
and inserting a clause in the lease providing that the breach of any of the
terms of the franchise agreement constitutes a breach of the lease, thus re-
sulting in its termination. The franchisor may then seek to regain posses-
sion of the site by summary dispossess proceedings in which the only
question is right to possession of the property. The lease having been
terminated, the franchisee has no right to possession; and having lost the
site of the franchised business, the franchisee has effectively lost his fran-
chise.
This note discusses some of the ways to limit the present and po-
tential abuse of summary dispossess proceedings. Several methods to halt
the abuse are considered:
(1) the imposition of fiduciary obligations on the franchisor, due
to the nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, thereby effective-
ly limiting the power of the franchisor to terminate the agreement or
lease;
(2) application and expansion by courts in summary dispossess pro-
ceedings of the limitations on franchise terminations to the lease termi-
nations;
(3) use of the antitrust laws to enjoin any action in the summary
dispossess proceedings until the alleged antitrust violations (which could
affect the franchisor's right to terminate the lease) have been litigated8
II. SUMMARY DISPOSSESS PROCEEDINGS
In most states, summary dispossess proceedings are authorized by for-
cible entry and detainer statutes.4 As the name of these statutes suggests,
summary dispossess proceedings are employed in those situations in which
someone not entitled to possession forcefully gains possession of the
property and so retains possession. Also covered by these statutes are
those instances where a lease has been terminated and the tenant is
"holding-over" after the term of his lease has ended (which would be
the position of a franchisee whose lease had been terminated and who
was struggling to retain his franchise). Some states have unlawful de-
tainer statutes5 which deal specifically with the hold-over tenant. Under
most of the forcible entry and detainer statutes, as well as the unlawful
3 No attempt is here made to deal with the antitrust problems in any detail. They are
merely pointed up for consideration by the reader. The bulk of the arguments here pre-
seated are focused around the imposition of fiduciary obligations on the franchisor, and on
the extension of limitation on franchise termination and/or lease termination.
4 See, e.g., CAL CIv. PRO. § 1161 (West 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § 2 (Smith-
Hurd 1951); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, §§ 1-3 (1956); miCH. STAT. ANN, §
600.5634 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 534.030 (1953); N.Y. RIIAL PROP. ACTIONS §§ 701-
767 (McKinney 1965); OIIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1923.01-.02 (Page 1968); PA. STAT. ANN.
t. 68, §§ 250.501-.510 (1965).
5 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. § 1161 (West 1955); Mo. ANN. SrAT. § 534.030 (1953).
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detainer statutes, the sole issue is right to possession of the property.' The
right to present any counterclaims or affirmative defenses is denied,7 and
presentation of equitable defenses, if not denied, is strictly limited." The
landowner, by showing his right to possession (the lease having been ter-
minated), is entitled to a writ of dispossession, forcing the hold-over
tenant to abandon the property.
One important problem which affects a significant number of fran-
chisees is that it is possible for the franchisee to have his franchise ef-
fectively terminated by a process affording little opportunity for defense
in cases where he has a lease or sublease from the franchisor? In almost
40 percent of the fast food franchises, the franchisee leases or subleases
the land and buildings from the franchisor.10 The potential for effec-
tively terminating franchises by terminating the lease is obvious.
Presently, the franchisee is not without legal remedies. There are
damage remedies, but the problems of proof inherent in all damage ac-
tions are present. Besides, while the damage suit is pending, the fran-
chisee, having at least -temporarily lost his business, often has no means of
livelihood. The expense involved in prosecuting any action is substan-
tial even when a source of income is available, but when the plaintiff
has been deprived of his income, such expense may represent an insur-
mountable barrier.
Perhaps the best and most logical way to ameliorate the problems
presented by the summary dispossess proceedings is to permit the presen-
tation of equitable defenses in such proceedings directly. In Rosewood
Corp. v. Fisher,"' the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the state's forcible
entry and detainer statute," in conjunction with its Civil Practice Act,"3
to allow equitable defenses to be presented to and determined by the court
6See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970);
White v. Ziegenhardt, 339 Mich. 195, 63 N.W.2d 625 (1954); Drzewiecki v. Stock-Daniel
Hardware Co., 293 S.W. 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
7 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970).
8 See, e.g., Webmeier v. Young, 9 Mich. App. 65, 155 N.W.2d 885 (1967); Drzewieddi
v. Stock-Daniel Hardware Co., 293 S.W. 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
9 There is no empirical data available as to the frequency with which these abuses occur.
Harold Brown points out in his article, supra note 1, the tremendous tum-over per year in
service station franchises. Probably a significant factor in this turn-over is the wide-spread
practice of leasing the site to the franchisee with termination provisions. For examples of the
franchisor having terminated a lease and having instituted summary dispossess proceedings,
see Helfenbein v. International Industries, Inc, 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971); Union Oil
Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716,84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970).1D U. B. OzANNE and S. D. HUNT, THE EcoNoIuc EFFECrS op FRANCHISING, at 4-29
to 4-30 (1971). Relatively few studies have been done on franchised businesses. However,
a comprehensive study of fast food franchised businesses was undertaken and the results were
published in the study cited above.
1146 IL 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 cert. denied, 401 U.S. 928 (1970).
12 LL- ANN. STAT. ch. 57 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
33 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
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in a summary dispossess hearing.14  The court stated that when the de-
fendant presents equitable defenses the trial court must exercise its discre-
tion, ordering such payments as it deems proper and providing for any
other equitable arrangements necessary to protect the property and interests
of all the parties during the pendency of the litigation. " By employing
this procedure the court is able to protect the property interests of the
plaintiff (owner, landlord, franchisor) while affording some protection for
the interests of the defendant (tenant franchisee). The court in Rose-
wood allowed equitable defenses which it felt were needed to permit
.necessary equitable -relief."'16 Therefore, the question of what constitutes
an "equitable defense" sufficient to require the court to grant "necessary
equitable relief" is an important one to the franchisee.
III. NECESSARY EQUITABLE RELIEF
A. Implicit in the Nature of the Relationship in Franchising1
What kind of a relationship is the franchisor-franchisee relationship?
Are the franchisor and franchisee merely independent businessmen? It
has been suggested that the franchise arrangement produces a fiduciary
relationship,"8 and if so, the franchisor's power to terminate would be
severely limited. One possibility then is that a court in a summary dis-
possess proceeding might allow the franchisee to show the existence of
a fiduciary relationship as an "equitable defense" to allow "necessary
equitable relief."
In order to assess the contention that the franchise arrangement pro-
duces a fiduciary relationship it is necessary to determine what the basis is
for such a relationship. In response to this problem, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that confidence reposed in one side, resulting in domination
and influence over the other, should be the test:
[Clourts of equity will not set any bounds to the facts and circumstances
out of which a fiduciary relationship may spring. It includes not only
all legal relations such as guardian and ward, attorney and client, prin-
cipal and agent and the like, but it extends to every possible case in which
a fiduciary relationship exists in fact, and in which there is confidence
reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other.
• . . The relationship need not be legal, but it may be moral, social, do-
mestic or merely personal.19
14 46 Ill. 2d 249, 257-8, 263 N.E.2d 833, 838, cert. denied, <01 U.S. 928 (1970); see also
Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716,84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970).
1546 Ill. 2d 249, 258, 263 N.E.2d 833, 839, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 928 (1970).
18 Id., 263 N.E.2d at 838.
1 A significant portion of the analysis in this subsection is drawn from Brown, Fran.
chising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEXAS L. Ruv. 650 (1971).
18 Brown, supra note 1.
19 Children's Home of Rockford v. Andress, 380 I11. 452, 465, 44 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1942)
(citations omitted).
[Vol. 33
FRANCHISE SYMPOSIUM
Likewise, the California Supreme Court pointed to the significance of con-
trol by one person over the property of another. -0 Most importantly, the
Illinois decision suggests a broad definition of a fiduciary relationship to be
used by courts of equity.
Does the franchise arrangement meet either or both of the criteria
mentioned above? In order to meet the "control" criterion, the fran-
chisor must have dominion over the property of the franchisee. It is,
therefore, necessary to find that the franchisee has contributed capital to
the enterprise. Control of the franchisee's property by the franchisor
must then also be found. At the heart of most franchise agreements
is a trademark licensing agreement. The use and licensing of trademarks
is regulated by the Lanham Act 2 ' which permits the use of the trademark
by a related company, provided the licensor adequately controls the li-
censee. The question then is whether the minimum control which must
be exercised by the franchisor under the requirements of the Lanham
Act is sufficient to impose fiduciary obligations on the franchisor. In a
California decision dealing with the extent of control required to create
a fiduciary relationship, the court found that the husband's management
and control over the community property placed him in the status of trus-
tee for his wife's interest in the community property.22 The control (and
management) in this case appears to have been exclusive control over
the property of another. However, if the broad definition of the fidu-
ciary relationship as used by the Illinois court is adopted and combined
with the control definition suggested by the California court, a strong argu-
ment can be made that less than exclusive control over the property of an-
other should still be enough to create a fiduciary relationship.
The minimal control required by the Lanham Act is very often ex-
ceeded by the actual control exercised by the franchisor. The control
enjoyed by the franchisor is substantial, regulating the "quality" of the
product or service being sold. The subjective nature of the term "quality"
results in uncertainty concerning the extent of control required by the
Lanham Act and also allows the franchisor, on the theory that he is pro-
tecting the quality of his product, to exercise such a degree of control over
the franchisee to indicate that a fiduciary relationship is created by such
control. The description of the franchise relationship, quoted below,
buttresses the argument that a franchisor often does enjoy a significant
amount of control over the franchisee:
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity
in the positions of the parties--the franchisor combining the roles of
2 0 Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 338, 364 P.2d 247, 253, 15 CaL Bptr. 71, 77
(1961).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1064(e)(1), 1127 (1964).
22Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 338, 364 P.2d 247, 253, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77
(1961).
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father, teacher, and drill sergeant, with the franchisee relegated to those of
son, pupil, and buck-private, respectively. At the core of the franchise
relationship is the contractual control exercised by the franchisor over
every aspect of the franchisee's business. Starting with the advertisement
which calls for "no experience," the franchisor inculcates the franchisee
with the necessity of being taught, guided, and controlled not only during
the initial training period but throughout the existence of the franchise.
The franchisor controls the site, commissary purchases, purchases from
other vendors, method of business operations, labor practices, quality con-
trol, merchandising, and even record keeping. This control is buttressed
by the contractual requirement that the franchisee must obey the command
of the Operating Manual as expounded by the franchisor's supervisor,
on pain of losing the franchise if he disobeys them and under constant
threat of such termination. And upon termination, or failure to renew,
the franchisee is confronted with the covenant not to compete and for-
feiture of his equity in the business.2
The court in the Illinois decision stated that a court should look to the
facts and circumstances, not just to the legal relationships, to determine if a
fiduciary relationship exists 4 It is difficult to argue that "facts and circum-
stances" as stated in the above description of a franchise should not be
found sufficient, given criteria of control and confidence, to result in a
finding of "fiduciary relationship" by a court of equity. The control
suggested by that description is nearly exclusive; the "confidence reposed
on the one side" and the "resulting domination and influence on the other
side," to which the Illinois court looked to find a fiduciary relationship,
is clearly present. Where such control and dependence exist, the courts
should recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship. It is not here
contended that all franchise relationships are like the one described previ-
ously, but the courts should look to the "facts and circumstances" of each
case to see if such a relationship (or one similar) does exist in justly de-
ciding the case.
Although courts of the United States have been slow to consider the
applicability of fiduciary obligations to franchising, a Canadian court has
considered such applicability. Basing its holding on equitable concepts,
the court concluded:
In this particular type of relationship, it appears . . . that franchisor
and franchisee are bound together over a long period of years in a rela-
tionship which in many respects is almost as close as that of master and
servant. While of course it is not the same, nevertheless the relationship
is so close that confidence is necessarily reposed by the one in the other.2 6
The court there held that the abuse of such confidence through self-prefer-
ence was actionable. The applicability of fiduciary obligations to fran-
2 3 H. BROWN, FRANcHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 41 (1969).
24 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
25Jirna, Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd., 3 Ont. 629, 639-40 (High Court of Jus-
tice 1970).
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chising have also been recognized, at least informally, here in the United
States by the Federal Trade Commission. General Counsel of the Federal
Trade Commission stated:
[F]ranchisors frequently speak of their relationship with the franchisees as
being one of trust and confidence. It is truly a fiduciary relationship.-6
The courts in the United States should formally recognize the applicability
of fiduciary obligations to franchising.
After recognizing the fiduciary relationship in the franchising arrange-
ment, a court in a summary dispossess proceeding should permit the fran-
chisee to present the defense of the franchisor's fiduciary obligations as a
requisite to equitable relief. Courts should look to the termination of the
franchisee's lease to determine if the franchisor, in terminating the lease
(and therefore effectively the franchise) has breached his obligations.
When the court finds a breach of fiduciary duty, it should refuse to grant
the summary dispossess order. The termination of the lease could not then
be used as a subterfuge, effectively terminating the franchise, when
the franchise itself could not be directly terminated.
B. Limitations on Franchise Terminations27
There are several direct limitations placed on contract terminations;
however, these limitations are narrow in scope. Among them are the de-
fenses of economic duress, waiver and estoppel. In some instances, a
requirement of reasonableness or "good faith" is made an integral part of
the agreement, or a reasonable time is granted for the franchisee to recoup
his losses. Additionally, a tort action may be available to the franchisee,
but for all practical purposes, when recovery for termination of a franchise
is sought, the franchisee must show that the original offer by the franchisor
was fraudulent.28  Unconscionability is yet another defense to franchise
termination that could be extended to lease termination.
The defense of economic duress, although not yet recognized or applied
in the franchise termination situation by the courts, could arguably be ap-
plied where unjust enrichment of the terminating party would result from
enforcement of harsh termination provisions.22 Waiver and estoppel may
be effective defenses where the franchisee can show that the franchisor dis-
pensed with the performance by the franchisee of a condition in the con-
tract (waiver) or that the franchisee was led to reasonably rely on the
26 Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Businesses Before the Subcomm. on
Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Busines, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1970) (statement of John V. Buffington, General Counsel, FTC).
2 A significant portion of the analysis in this subsection is drawn from Gellhorn, supra
note 2. For a more extensive analysis of some of the ideas presented in this subsection, see this
source.
28 Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 485.
29 Id. at 486.
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non-enforcement of a condition which the franchisor now attempts to en-
force.3 0
Limitations of "reasonableness" as to franchise terminations have been
applied by some courts in borrowing the "Missouri doctrine" from agency
law."1 These cases suggest the necessity of giving a reasonable time or
fair opportunity for the franchisee to recover his expenditures before al-
lowing the franchisor to terminate, especially where there has been substan-
tial investment by the franchisee and the franchise does not state a definite
duration. Although most franchise agreements provide for a definite
term, when the clauses and conditions in the agreement provide for (or ef-
fectively permit") termination at will, it would seem that the limitations
permitting a fair opportunity to recover the investment should be applied.
What constitutes a reasonable time must be determined from the cir-
cumstances at the time of the franchisor's attempt to terminate.3 ' In de-
ciding what was a reasonable time to recoup the investment, the cases have
measured the period from the time the relationship began to the time of
the attempted cancellation and have provided for a one to three year min-
imum as "reasonable." 35  In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors,
Inc.,3" the court suggested several factors which should be considered in
determining a "reasonable time":
1. the amount of preliminary and promotional expenditures;
2. the length of time the distributorship [franchise] has been in oper-
ating before notice of termination;
3. what the prospects for future profits are; and
4. whether it [the franchise] has proven profitable during actual op-
eration.
Although the allowance by courts of a "reasonable .time" to recoup the in-
vestment is a step toward protecting the franchisee, it must here be rec-
ognized that it only prevents sudden termination. Rather than preventing
termination, it merely lengthens the process.
Good faith in terminating the contract is another possible limitation on
the lease termination. Courts in many states have recognized that good
faith and fair dealing are implicit parts of a contract.3 7 In Goltra v.
30 Id. at 486-89.
31 Id. at 479.
32d. at 480.
33 Brown, supra note 1, at 662: "The usual requirements of the franchise contract are im-
possible to attain, so that it may well be said that franchisees are always in default."
3 4 Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1964).
35 See, e.g., Hunt Foods v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1957) (16 months not a reasonable
time); J. C. Millert Co. v. Park & Tilford, Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
(one year minimum); Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12 (1957) (rehearing denied,
1958) (three years not unreasonable as minimum).
36 253 N.C. 459,472, 117 S.E.2d 479,489 (1960).
37 See, e.g., Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1925); Earle R. Harson and Assoc. v. Farmer
Co-op Creamery Co., 403 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968); Deering Milliken Research Corp. v.
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Weeks,3" the United States Supreme Court dealt specifically with the situa-
tion described in this article concerning the significance of a good faith
limitation. The Court said:
The cases leave no doubt that such a provision [the stipulation that the
lessor could terminate the lease if in his judgment the lessee was not
complying with the obligations of the contract] for termination of a con-
tract is valid, unless there is an absence of good faith in the exercise of
judgment.39
A court in a summary dispossess proceeding, considering the Supreme
Court's statement in Goltra, should determine whether the termination was
in good faith.
A caveat, however, against placing great reliance on the good faith
limitation on terminations is that it is not particularly effective in prevent-
ing unfair terminations. 40 For example, the lessor-franchisor might in
good faith decide to terminate the lease when the lessee-franchisee has
breached a covenant to buy certain goods from the franchisor; yet the ter-
mination may be unfair to the franchisee because of other effects triggered
by termination (e.g., buy-back clause may cause forced sale prices; or lack
of a reasonable time for the franchisee to recoup his investment may cause
substantial and unnecessary loss). These and other abuses may result, but
the termination itself would still be in good faith.41
Unconscionability of the contract or of certain terms of the contract is
another possible limitation on the right to terminate. Historically, the
courts of equity limited unconscionability as a defense to contracts which
had sunk to "madman levels," where a man in his right senses would not
accept the terms.4 However, "as a result of agitation for its applicability
to inconsistent standardized contract terms which were not negotiated and
because of its inclusion in the Uniform Commercial Code,"4 3 there has re-
cently been a significant change in the applicability of the doctrine of un-
conscionability.
Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970); Beaugureau v. Beaugureau, 11 Arir.
App. 234, 463 P.2d 540 (1970); Davis v. Kahn, 7 Cal. App. 3d 868, 86 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1970);
Griswald v. Hear, Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 229 A.2d 183 (1967); Division of Triple T Service,
Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. C. 1969), ajPd m m., 311
N.Y.S.2d 961 (App. Div. 1969); Tharpe v. G. E. Moore Co., 254 S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397
(1970); Golden State Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 380 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 19(4);
Shaw v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 126 VL 206, 226 A.2d 903 (1967).
38271 U.S. 536 (1925).
391d. at 548 (emphasis added).
4 0 Gellhorn, supra note 2 at 504-5.
4 1 It is possible that when termination triggers events which came an unconsdonable loss
of property to the franchisor, it can never be said to be "in good faith" at least when the
franchisor knows such losses am sure to ensue. This comment, however, is limited to the
question of whether the franchisor had sufficient reason to terminate the lease. "Good faith"
is here limited to such considerations. For a consideration of the effect of clauses affecting such
unconscionable loss, see text immediately following.
42 Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 490.
43id. at 508.
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There is an "uneasy consensus" that the definition of goods in § 2-102
of the Uniform Commercial Code44 is too narrow to include the entire fran-
chise agreement.45 But the policy behind the Code concept of unconscio-
nability would be equally as applicable to franchise agreements as to sales
agreements. Section 2-302 provides for relief from unconscionable con-
tracts and contract terms. The Comment following that section states that
the test for unconscionability should be whether, in the light of the gen-
eral commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be oppressive.
Since the UCC has been adopted in 49 states there would seem to be an
agreement as to what is unconscionable in the commercial world, at least
in regard to sales. Due to the wide acceptance of this definition and the
dearly commercial nature of franchising, the application of this definition
to franchising would seem only logical. Where in light of the general
commercial background and the needs of the particular trade the terms are
oppressive, the relief available under § 2-302 should be granted; that it is
the termination of a lease contract that is involved in summary dispossess
proceedings should not present an insurmountable obstacle, since the policy
behind the unconscionability doctrine (the prevention of oppressively one-
sided contracts) is applicable to such a contract as well. Some courts have
already applied the substance of some of the Article Two (Sales) sections
to a lease contract, stating that the policy reasons behind the Code sections
were applicable to leasing contracts as well as to sales contracts,40 and
others have intervened on equitable grounds under particular circumstances
to prevent the termination of a lease for a breached covenant or condi-
tion where the termination (or forfeiture as the cascs refer to it) would
dearly lead to an unduly oppressive result.4 7
An article entitled Limitations On Contract Termination Rights-Fran-
chise Cancellations4a suggests a standard which goes beyond that provided
by UCC § 2-302 and that set by the equity courts:
[W]here it appears that the termination conditions seem unfair even
though they meet the business practices of the industry and were negoti-
ated, their fairness could be tested by requiring that the condition which
"creates" the right to terminate the agreement in one party must bear a
reasonable relationship to the risks sought to be allocated and the bene-
fits granted by the agreement.49
44 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-102 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
45 Ray, supra note 1, at 236.
46 See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
47 See Dreisonstok v. Dworman Bldg. Corp., 264 Md. 50, 284 AL2d 400 (1971); Howard
Johnson Co. v. Madigan, - Mass.- , 280 N.E.2d 689 (1972); Fly Hi Music Corp. v.
645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Hyman v. Cohen,
73 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
48 Gellhorn, supra note 2.
40 Id. at 512 (emphasis in the original).
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In adapting this unconscionability test to the termination situation and fo-
cusing upon the time of termination, it is further suggested that the test
might be:
[W]hether the harm which will or is likely to result to the terminated
party from enforcing the termination provision is proportional to the
harm which will or is likely to result to the terminating party if the provi-
sion is not enforced.60
"Disproportionate" harm is the harm which this test would seek to pre-
vent.
51
This standard is workable and flexible. The test is also easily adaptable
to lease terminations. When the harm which would be suffered by the
lessee upon termination is disproportionately greater than that which
would be suffered by the lessor should the termination be disallowed, the
writ of dispossession should not issue. The courts' options could be those
provided in UCC § 2-302: '2
1. refusal to enforce the contract;
2. enforcement of the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause; or
3. limitation of the application of any unconscionable clause so as to
avoid the unconscionable result.
In the case of a "terminated" lessee, one of the latter two remedies might
be more appropriate.
IV. ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
To speak of antitrust problems involved in "franchising" is really to
speak about almost the entire antitrust field, for it is difficult to think of
any aspect of antitrust that would be irrelevant.53
It is not the purpose of this note to go into the merits of the various pos-
sible antitrust claims, but merely to bring to the reader's attention the pos-
sibility of their existence and the use of such claims in attempting to pre-
vent the issuance of the dispossessory warrant in summary dispossess
proceedings. Sections of franchising agreements which may violate anti-
trust law may include tying arrangements, exclusive dealing arrangements,
territorial restrictions, customer restrictions, price fixing, and price dis-
criminationY5
old. at 5 17-8 (emphasis omitted).
51 Id. at 518.
521d. at 520.
53 Pollock, Antitrust Problems in Franchising, 15 N.Y.L FoRtmi 106 (1969).
54AveriU, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.
FORUm 39 (1969); Borowitz, Pricing Problems in Distributor and Franchiso Systems, 38 U.
CQN. L REv. 258 (1969); Hoerner, Some Issues in Ting and Exclusive Dealing, 38 U.
CIN. L REV. 233 (1969); Mclaren, Marketing Limitations on Indcpcndent Distributors and
Dealers-Prices, Territories, Customers, and Hardling of Competitive Products, 13 Awrn.
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The allegation of an antitrust violation may be useful to the franchisee
although the various states have treated differently the question of the de-
fensive use of alleged antitrust violations. Some states have allowed their
defensive use,55 while others have not."' It is necessary then to determine
whether or not the state in which the dispossessory proceedings are taking
place normally allows the defensive use in its state courts of the alleged
antitrust violations. Even if they do allow such defenses, the problem
of submitting defenses in summary dispossess proceedings still exists. 7
If the defenses are not permitted to be introduced in that proceeding
or if the forum state does not allow the defensive use of alleged anti-
trust violations, another alternative is available. Under § 16 of the Clay-
ton Act68 where an antitrust violation can be shown along with an imme-
diate danger of irreparable harm or loss, a federal court may be willing to
issue a preliminary injunction, enjoining or staying further action in the
summary dispossess proceeding until the antitrust claim is adjudicated. 0
A possible obstacle is the provision in § 16 that an injunction shall issue
"when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity."6 The problem presented by this language is that the
franchisee is a party to the contract which he alleges to be in violation of
the antitrust laws. Since equity refuses to grant relief where the person
seeking relief does not have "clean hands," a court of equity may look to
the contract to determine whether the plaintiff is eligible for equitable re-
lief. In so doing, it may of course realize that in the franchise relation-
ship a great disparity in the positions of the parties often exists.0 ' It has
been recognized that even though a party might be considered "technically
TRUST BULL. 161 (1968); Pogue, Vertical Restrictions on Price, Territory and Customcrsn-
The Certainty of Uncertainty, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 272 (1968); Pollock, supra note 53; Row-
land, Designing Distribution Systems: Antitrust Problems in Franchising and Marketing, 34
Mo. L. REV. 178 (1969); Sadd, Territorial and Customer Restrictions After Scaly and Schminn,
38 U. CIN. L. RE v. 249 (1969); Wilson, Exclusionary Restraints and Franchise Distribution,
12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1169 (1967); Note, Selected Antitrust Problems of the Frnachisor:
Exclusive Arrangements, Territorial Restrictions, and Franchise Termination, 22 U. FLA.
L. REV. 260 (1969); Antitrust Laws-Tying Arrangements-Franchisor's Tying Purchase of Sup-
plies to Licensing of Trade Name Held Unjustified by Alleged Busness Necessity, and Dam.
ages Awarded to Franchise-Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 84 HAR,' L. Rav. 1717 (1971).
55 Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 111. App.2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (1969); Big Top Stores, Inc,
v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 894, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897, afl'd, 36 App. Div. 2d
582, 318 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1970).56 Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rpt. 756 (1970); Burgess v.
Hogan, 175 So. 2d 924 (La. Ct. App. 1965); AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc.,
260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1961).
57 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
58 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
59 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). See Helfenbein v. International Industries, Inc., 438 F.2d 1068
(8th Cir. 1971); Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970).
60 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
61 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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in pari delicto," a court may look to the circumstances of the parties, and
relief is not necessarily barred by "technically unclean hands.' 6- A tem-
porary injunction may issue against the enforcement of the provisions of a
contract while the validity of the contract is dispute." In the franchise
situation, although it is the validity of the various terms of the contract
rather than the validity of the contract as a whole which is in dispute, it
seems that the principle should still apply. It should be possible for the
franchisee to prevent the issuance of the dispossessary warrant either by
presenting the antitrust violations as a defense or through injunctive pro-
ceedings in the federal courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Where the franchise premises are leased from the franchisor with the
franchise agreement's conditions and covenants incorporated into the lease,
allowing termination of the lease upon default of any condition or cove-
nant, and where summary dispossess proceedings are available after such
termination, the potential for abuse is clear. In the summary dispossess
proceeding in the state court, this potential for abuse should be recog-
nized, and courts should show a willingness to critically evaluate the fran-
chise relationship. When the court finds the requisite control over the
property of the franchisee it should impose fiduciary obligations upon
the franchisor. Such fiduciary obligations might well affect the franchisor's
power to terminate the lease of the franchisee. Recognition of the poten-
tial for abuse in summary dispossess hearings requires a willingness to
hear such defenses as are necessary for equitable relief. When such de-
fenses are valid, terminations should be limited to the extent necessary to
do justice to all parties involved.
Eugene H. Nemitz, Jr.
62 King v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
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